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Abstract The scalar particle even imposes a constraint on the likelihood of its
prejacent and the alternatives on which it operates. This semantic import of even
restricts its distribution: even that associates with a weak predicate in its immediate
surface scope – weak even, for short – is acceptable only if it is appropriately
embedded (cf. Lahiri 1998). This paper investigates the occurrence of weak even
in three modal environments: under non-factive and factive desire predicates and
in imperatives. The structure of the paper is the following: Section 1 describes an
approach to even according to which even may move at LF (Karttunen & Peters
1979, Lahiri 1998 and others). A prediction of the approach is that weak even
is licit only if it is embedded under a non-upward-entailing operator. Section 2
presents an apparent puzzle for the approach: weak even may occur in non-negative
desire statements and in imperatives, i.e. in environments that appear to be upward-
entailing. Section 3 discusses two strategies for dealing with these facts: according
to the first strategy, desire predicates and the imperative operator are non-monotone
(e.g. Heim 1992); according to the second strategy, they are upward-entailing (e.g.
von Fintel 1999) and weak even is rescued by covert exhaustification. Section 4
concludes the paper by discussing the licensing of certain negative polarity items in
these environments.
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1 The meaning and distribution of even
The primary semantic import of even is a scalar presupposition that orders the
prejacent of even with respect to the alternatives on which it operates.1 There have
been various proposals about the flavor and the quantificational strength of this
presupposition (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Kay 1990, Merin 1999, Herburger 2000
and many others). The choice between them is inconsequential for the discussion in
∗ Thanks to Gennaro Chierchia, Kai von Fintel, Danny Fox and Irene Heim for discussion as well as to
the audiences at the Göttingen workshop on polarity, WCCFL 29 and SALT 21.
1 Another inference that is often assumed to be triggered by even is the additive (or existential)
presupposition. Since additivity is largely tangential to the purposes of this paper, we leave it aside
and refer the reader to Rullmann 1997, Guerzoni 2003 and the references cited therein.
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this paper. For concreteness, we assume that the scalar presupposition triggered by
even requires the likelihood of its propositional argument to be lower than that of a
relevant alternative (Bennett 1982, Kay 1990):
(1) [[ even ]]g,c(C, p, w) is defined only if ∃q ∈ C [p Cc q].
If defined, [[ even ]]g,c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1
The sentence in (2a) has the structure in (2b) where even takes clausal scope at LF
and associates with the focused element John. The sentence presupposes that there
is an alternative that is more likely than the proposition that John made one video,
while its assertive meaning is that John made one video.
(2) a. Even JOHN made one video.
b. [even C1] [JohnF made one video]
c. [[ (2b) ]]g,c(w) is defined only if ∃q ∈ {that x made one video | x is
a relevant individual}: that John made one video Cc q. If defined,
[[ (2b) ]]g,c(w) = 1 iff John made one video in w
1.1 Scalarity, entailment and scope of even
The scalar presupposition triggered by even is subject to the principle in (3), which
follows from basic probability theory.2 The principle imposes a hard condition on
the distribution of even: if even is adjoined to a clause whose alternatives entail it, it
will trigger a presupposition that violates (3) and is thus unsatisfiable.
(3) Scalarity and entailment
If a proposition p entails a proposition q, q cannot be less likely than p.
An illustration of the principle is in (4). The sentence in (4a) presupposes that it
is less likely that John made one video than that he made some other number of
videos (4c). Since making n videos entails making one video for all n > 0, all the
alternatives in the domain of even entail its prejacent. According to (3), they cannot
be more likely than it. This clashes with (4c) and explains the deviance of (4a).
(4) a. #John made even ONE video.
b. [even C1] [John made oneF video]
c. [[ (4b) ]]g,c is defined only if ∃q ∈ {that John made n videos | n ∈ N>0}:
that John made one video Cc q
2 More precisely, it follows from Kolmogorov’s third axiom that states that the likelihood of a union of
mutually exclusive propositions equals the sum of the likelihoods of the propositions. Applied to (3),
if a proposition p entails a proposition q, it holds that the sum of the likelihoods of p and qrp equals
the likelihood of q. Since the likelihood of qrp is greater or equal to zero, it holds that the likelihood
of p is at most as great as the likelihood of q.
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A puzzle emerges when we look at certain embedded occurrences of even – in
particular at occurrences of even in the scope of downward-entailing operators. A
pertinent example is in (5a). If even were interepreted in situ in this sentence, it would
trigger the same scalar presupposition as in (4); the sentence would accordingly be
pragmatically deviant. Now, Karttunen & Peters (1979) have proposed that even
may covertly move out of its base position. Lahiri (1998) builds on this proposal to
explain the contrast between positive and negative sentences with weak even that
we see in (4) and (5): a rescue hatch is available to even in negative sentences –
it may covertly move above negation. That is, Lahiri assumes that the sentence in
(5a) may have the LF in (5b) where there is an intervening entailments-reversing
operator between the scoped even and its associate one. The presupposition of this
structure is that it is less likely that John didn’t make one video than, say, that John
didn’t make two videos (5c). Since the former proposition is logically stronger than
the latter, the presupposition is compatible with (3) and may very well be correct.
(5) a. John didn’t make even ONE video.
b. [even C1] [not [even C1] [John make oneF video]]
c. [[ (5b) ]]g,c(w) is defined only if ∃q ∈ {that John didn’t make n videos |
n ∈ N>0}: that John didn’t make one video Cc q
1.2 Prediction
The core ingredient of Lahiri’s (1998) proposal is the assumption that even may
move to avoid triggering an incorrect presupposition. He has shown that if even
that associates with a weak element in its immediate surface scope moves above
negation or other downward-entailing operators, the resulting structure can have a
consistent and plausible interpretation since downward-entailing operators reverse
entailments. However, moving even across an operator that reverses entailments is
not a necessary but a sufficient condition for configurations containing weak even
to comply with (3). The necessary condition is that even moves across an operator
that is not upward-entailing. Besides downward-entailing operators, these include
non-monotone operators.3,4
3 As pointed out by Rullmann (1997), a patent issue for this approach to even is that it allows for
non-canonical movement of even, e.g. even may move out of the antecedent of a conditional. A
possible way to defuse this issue has been suggested by Lahiri (2006): the scalar presupposition
that accompanies sentences with even is triggered by an even-like operator (EmphAssert in Krifka
1995, E in Chierchia 2006) that is attached at the clausal level to check the relevant feature of even;
even itself is truth-conditionally vacuous, it stays in situ and primarily conditions the insertion of the
even-like operator. In the following we retain for perspicuity the assumption that even itself moves.
4 According to (6), weak even should be able to occur in the scope of non-monotone quantifiers. This
prediction is borne out, as illustrated in (i). An investigation of this data and how it relates to the
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(6) A prediction of the movement approach to even
A sentence with a weak even is acceptable only if even is at surface structure
in the scope of a non-upward-entailing operator.
2 Weak even in desire statements and imperatives
Weak even may occur in the scope of non-negative desire predicates and in impera-
tives. This is at first sight at odds with the prediction in (6).
2.1 Non-factive desire predicates
Weak even may occur in the scope of non-negative desire predicates like hope and
would like. A few naturally occurring examples of this kind are given in (7) where
we boldface the embedding desire predicate and capitalize the focused element.
(7) a. I hope to someday make even ONE video of that quality.
b. In fact, I would like to find even ONE person who hasn’t had at least
one paper-cut this year. People without hands do not count.
c. Everyone wants to prevent even “ONE bad incident” as BellaQuest
points out.5
Another conspicuous instance of a non-factive desire predicate that licenses weak
even is wish. Two naturally occurring examples are given in (8).
(8) a. I wish I wrote even ONE riff featured on ANY Death album.
b. This Haley chick wishes she could sing even ONE note close to Janis.6
In languages that have a dedicated scalar particle (or a collocation of particles)
for weak even – e.g. auch nur in German (e.g. Guerzoni 2003) – that scalar particle
is used in examples that correspond to the above data. This is illustrated in (9) where
auch nur associates with 20%, an expression denoting a relatively low percentage.
(9) Ich
I
hoffe
hope
auch nur
even
20´%
20%
von
of
deiner
your
Begeisterung,
enthusiasm
die
that
du
you
ihm
him
geschenkt
given
hast,
have
bei
with
ihm
him
wach halten
sustain
zu können.
to be able
poorly understood occurrences of negative polarity items in these environments is pursued elsewhere
(Crnicˇ 2011).
(i) Exactly two congressmen read even ONE book.
5 http://vimeo.com/8918647, http://www.murdershewrites.com/tag/natalie-r-collins/,
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0„20141718,00.html
6 http://www.johnsoncitypress.com/News/article.php?id=91361, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c64DHj9yEI
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‘I hope to sustain even 20% of his excitement that you caused.’7
2.2 Factive desire predicates
It is well-known at least since Kadmon & Landman (1993) that weak even may
occur in the scope of non-downward-entailing factive desire predicates like glad
(10a). Weak even is licensed also in the scope of other factive evaluatives (10b).
(10) a. John is glad that he read even ONE paper on this topic.
b. It’s good/great/fantastic/interesting that John solved even ONE exer-
cise.
2.3 Imperatives
The final class of non-negative modal environments in which weak even may occur
are imperatives. Some examples of imperatives with weak even are given in (11)
where even associates with the weak predicate one. Translations of these imperatives
into German contain auch nur (12).
(11) a. Show me even ONE party that cares for the people.
b. Break even ONE record that I can’t.
c. Give me even just ONE reason not to hurt you.
(12) Zeig
show
mir
me
auch nur
even
eine
one
Partei
party
die
that
sich
self
wirklich
really
ums
for
Volk
people
kümmert.
cares
‘Show me even one party that really cares for the people.’8
These imperatives may be given natural paraphrases with the embedding predicates
challenge, dare and defy (13). Interestingly, if we make the paraphrases non-
performative, weak even continues to be licensed (14).
(13) a. I challenge you to show me even ONE party that cares for the people.
b. I dare you to score even ONE goal against my team.
(14) John challenged Steve to show him even ONE party that cares for the
people.
7 http://www.inahallermann.de/index.php?page=rueckmeldungenvonklienten
8 http://www.youtube.com/all_comments?v=VWTmA5oGkeQ
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2.4 Three challenges
Any approach to the above data faces three challenges. First: it needs to explain
why weak even in modal environments does not trigger an infelicitous scalar pre-
supposition. Second: it needs to explain the restriction of weak even to only a subset
of modal environments. Third: it needs to explain why the above sentences are
accompanied by a distinct bias. We describe these three challenges in turn.
Consistency of the scalar presupposition
The occurrence of weak even in the examples above is unexpected on common
assumptions about the semantics of desire predicates and the imperative operator –
namely, that they are upward-entailing (e.g. Hintikka 1962, Schwager 2005). That
is, they are commonly taken to license inferences along the lines of (15a): for all n >
0, that I hope to make n videos entails that I hope to make one video. In accordance
with the condition (3), any likelihood relation between the propositions in (15a)
satisfies the condition in (15b): for all n > 0, that I hope to make n videos is at most
as likely as that I hope to make one video.
(15) a. that I hope to make one video⇐ that I hope to make two videos⇐ ...
b. ... Ec that I hope to make two videos Ec that I hope to make one video
Now, the sentence in (16a), repeated from above, may be assigned the structures in
(16b,c). In one structure even stays in situ, while in the other it moves above the
desire predicate hope.
(16) a. I hope to someday make even ONE video of that quality.
b. [I hope [[even C1] [PROI to make oneF video of that quality]]]
c. [even C1] [I hope PROI to make oneF video of that quality]
We have seen in the introduction that if even stays in situ (16b), its scalar presuppo-
sition is illicit. The same holds if even scopes above hope: the scalar presupposition
triggered by even, given in (17), is at odds with the fact in (15b) – it cannot both
hold that every alternative is at most as likely as the prejacent (15b) and that there is
an alternative that is more likely than the prejacent (17). We are at an impasse.
(17) [[ (17c) ]]g,c is defined only if ∃q ∈ {that I hope to make n videos of that
quality | n ∈ N>0}: that I hope to make one video of that quality Cc q
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Constrained distribution of weak even in modal environments
Weak even is not licit in every type of modal environment. More to the point, it is not
licit in epistemic and doxastic modal environments, e.g. in the scope of epistemic
and doxastic attitude predicates like know, believe and think:
(18) #John knows/thinks that he will make even ONE video of that quality.
Furthermore, weak even is also illicit in the scope of certain non-doxastic attitude
predicates. This holds for intend (19a) and the directive attitude predicates command
and order (19b). As we have pointed out above, certain directive predicates differ
from command and allow for a licit occurrence of weak even in their scope (20).
(19) a. #John intends to make even ONE video of that quality.
b. #John commanded me to make even ONE video of that quality.
(20) a. John challenged me to make even ONE video of that quality
b. I urge you to plant even ONE of these tubers9
Extra inference
The occurrences of weak even in desire statements and imperatives are accompanied
by a distinct bias. For example, the sentences in (21) induce the inferences that I take
it to be unlikely that the addressee will find any party that cares for the people and
that I take it to be unlikely that I will make one video of that quality, respectively.
(21) a. Show me even ONE party that cares for the people.
b. I hope to someday make even ONE video of that quality.
More generally, contexts in which non-negative desire statements or imperatives
with weak even are used satisfy the condition in (22).10
9 http://www.cherrymenlove.com/gardening_flowers/2011/03/story-from-a-spring-garden.html
10 The sentences in (i) appear not to trigger a low probability bias: it is very likely that Tyson will
inspire a lot of kids and due to his well-known self-confidence he probably believes in it too (ia); (ib)
may be addressed to a very generous philanthropist who is expected to donate a lot of money.
(i) a. Tyson, who said he hopes to inspire even ONE kid to turn his life around, has given
similar speeches around the world. (http://www.lvrj.com/sports/15870627.html)
b. If you can’t come, PLEASE donate even ONE DOLLAR. (http://iam.bmezine.com/
?rebekahsxrevenge)
We suggest that even these sentences are accompanied by a low probability bias – the difference
between them and the cases in the main text is that bias in (i) has the flavor of polite pretense. For
example, it arguably holds that although Tyson may in fact be certain that he will inspire many kids,
(ia) presents him as being excessively humble and falsely modest – i.e. low probability bias obtains
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(22) Low probability bias
A context satisfies the low probability bias wrt a set of alternatives and an
individual if the individual takes the alternatives to be unlikely to obtain
A closely related restriction has been discussed by Kadmon & Landman (1993)
with respect to the occurrence of weak even in the scope of factive desire predicates.
For example, they have claimed that (23) is licit only in contexts in which we did not
get better tickets than these tickets (Kadmon & Landman 1993: 385). That is, their
characterization differs from (22) in that it requires the attitude holder to believe that
the alternatives have not obtained and not that they were unlikely to obtain.
(23) I’m glad we even got THESE tickets!
However, their characterization is too strong in light of the data in (24). In contrast,
the weaker characterization in (22) correctly describes the contexts in which (24)
and its ilk may be used – the attitude holder only needs to believe that it was unlikely
that the relevant alternatives will obtain rather than believe that they did not obtain.
(24) Just be glad that the Eastern networks could even FIND Elko, let alone have
a camera there to record the speech.11
To summarize: we have presented puzzling data concerning the distribution
of weak even – namely, weak even may occur in modal environments that have
traditionally been classified as upward-entailing. Two further puzzles concerning
the occurrence of weak even in modal environments were presented: weak even is
restricted to a subset of modal environments (desire statements, imperatives) and its
occurrence is accompanied by a distinct bias.
3 Steps towards a resolution
Two resolutions of the above puzzles are presented. The first is based on Heim’s
(1992) non-monotone desire semantics, while the second is based on von Fintel’s
(1999) monotone desire semantics. In the latter case, an additional mechanism needs
to be employed to account for the felicity of weak even.
under pretense. This allows us to stick to (22) as a uniform characterization of all the data.
11 http://www.wayiplay.com/news/why-wont-news-networks-air-complete-political-speech-rallies-
from-start-to-finish
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3.1 Non-monotone desire
Negation-related semantics of desire and non-monotonicity
Heim (1992) proposes that to want p is, roughly, to believe that p is desirable (good).
The belief component of this meaning is fleshed out as a doxastic accessibility
function that returns for an attitude holder x and a world w a set of worlds compatible
with the beliefs of x in w (cf. Hintikka 1962), while the desirability component is
characterized relationally: a proposition is desirable iff it is preferred to its negation,
which is the case iff every world in the proposition is better than every world in the
negation of the proposition. In the case at hand, these propositions are constituted
by the closest belief worlds of the attitude holder in which the proposition denoted
by the sentential complement of want and its negation, respectively, hold:12
(25) If defined, [[ want ]]g,c(, p, i, w) = 1 iff ∀w’ ∈ DOX(i, w):
SIM(w’, DOX(i, w) ∩ p) i,w SIM(w’, DOX(i, w) r p)
The presupposition triggered by want is that, roughly, its propositional argument is
logically independent of the beliefs of the attitude holder. Accordingly, the sentence
in (26a) presupposes that John neither believes that he will make one video of that
quality nor that he won’t make one video of that quality; its assertive meaning is
computed in (26b): the closest belief worlds of John in which he makes one video
of that quality are better than the closest belief worlds of John in which he does not.
(26) a. John wants to make one video of that quality.
b. If defined, [[ [John [wants [PROJ to make one video ...] ]]g,c(w) = 1
iff ∀w’ ∈ DOX(i, w): SIM(w’, DOX(i, w) ∩ that John makes one video)
i,w SIM(w’, DOX(i, w) ∩ that John makes no videos)
The semantics of desire predicates like hope, wish and glad is built up in a similar
fashion, though some modifications might be needed with respect to the presup-
positions of the predicates and the relata compared (cf. Heim 1992 for details).
Furthermore, an analogous meaning can also be assigned to the imperative operator.
We simplistically assume that there are two differences between it and desire predi-
cates: first, the imperative operator does not quantify over the beliefs of an attitude
holder but over the worlds in the context set, cs(c); second, the imperative operator
12 A preference relation among propositions is defined on the basis of a preference relation among
worlds as in (ia) (cf. von Wright 1963: 31); the maximal similarity function is defined as in (ib)
(Lewis 1973). We leave the similarity relation ≤ out of our representations.
(i) a. p i,w q ≡df ∀w’,w”(p(w’) = 1 ∧ q(w”) = 1→ w’ i,w w”)
b. SIM(≤, w, p) ≡df λw’. p(w’) = 1 ∧ ∀w”(p(w”) = 1→ w’ ≤w w”)
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triggers additional presuppositions that are responsible for its performativity (cf.
Schwager 2005 for a thorough discussion of performativity of imperatives).
(27) If defined, [[ IMP ]]g,c(, p, w) = 1 iff ∀w’ ∈ cs(c):
SIM(w’, cs(c) ∩ p) sp(c),w SIM(w’, cs(c) r p)
The imperative in (28a) has the meaning in (28b): given the speaker’s preferences, it
is better that you show me one party that cares than that you show me no parties that
care. And since the speaker is an authority, the imperative effects a command.
(28) a. Show me one party that cares.
b. If defined, [[ IMP [you show me one party that cares] ]]g,c(w) = 1 iff
∀w’ ∈ cs(c): SIM(w’, cs(c) ∩ that you show me one party that cares)
sp(c),w SIM(w’, cs(c) ∩ that you don’t show me one party that cares)
The negation-related semantics described above is non-monotone. For example,
it predicts the propositions denoted by (29) to be logically independent. Namely,
assume that it holds (i) that I prefer making two videos of that quality to making no or
exactly one video of that quality and (ii) that I prefer making no videos of that quality
to making exactly one video of that quality. Clearly, (29b) is true in the scenario due
to (i). (29a) is false in the scenario if there are belief worlds where I make exactly
one video: the closest belief worlds to them in which I make one video of that quality
are due to (ii) not better than those in which I make no videos. This demonstrates
the non-upward-entailingness of desire predicates on the negation-related analysis.
Their non-downward-entailingness can be demonstrated in a similar way.
(29) a. I hope to make one video of that quality.
b. I hope to make two videos of that quality.
Consistency of the scalar presupposition
The sentence in (30a) where weak even occurs in the scope of hope may have
the LF given in (30b) where even scopes above the desire predicate. The scalar
presupposition that it triggers is given in (30c): there is an alternative that is more
likely than that I hope to make one video of that quality.
(30) a. I hope to make even ONE video of that quality.
b. [even C1] [I hope [[even C1] PROI to make oneF video ...]]
c. ∃q ∈ {that I hope to make n videos of that quality | n ∈ N>0}: that I
hope to make one video of that quality Cc q
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Since it holds that none of the alternatives in the domain of scoped even entail the
prejacent of even, the scalar presupposition is compatible with the condition in (3).
This is in line with the prediction in (6): weak even may be acceptable in the scope
of a non-upward-entailing operator – in particular, a non-monotone operator.
Plausibility of the scalar presupposition
However, the condition that there are alternatives in the domain of even that do not
entail the prejacent of even is only a necessary and not yet a sufficient condition
for the felicity of even. Since the scalar presupposition described in (30c) is not
trivial, it is expected to be satisfied only in certain contexts. In particular, it is
satisfied in contexts in which it holds (i) that if there are preferences that distinguish
between a proposition that one makes a certain number of videos of that quality
and a proposition that one makes another number of videos of that quality, then the
proposition that describes one as making a greater number of videos of that quality
will be preferred to the proposition that describes one as making a lower number
of videos of that quality13 and (ii) that some relevant alternatives are preferentially
distinguishable from the proposition that I make one video of that quality. In such
a context, the proposition that I hope to make one video of that quality being true
necessitates the distinguishable alternative, say, the proposition that I hope to make
two videos of that quality to be true as well (if defined). Furthermore, it holds that
the reverse relation is not true in such a context: if I hope to make two videos of that
quality, it does not follow that I hope to make one video of that quality. For example,
it may be that I hope to make two videos of that quality but that I prefer making no
videos to exactly one video of that quality. It consequently does not hold that I hope
to make one video of that quality. Thus, relative to the information state that satisfies
(i) and (ii), there is an alternative that is more likely than that I hope to make one
video of that quality – this is ex hypothesi the proposition that I hope to make two
videos of that quality.
There are contexts that do not satisfy the two conditions discussed above: con-
texts in which people are indifferent between making a greater and making a lower
number of videos of that quality, contexts in which they prefer making a lower to
making a greater number of videos of that quality, and contexts in which it is open
what people’s preferences are. Since besides its desiderative component, which is not
helpful in the just described contexts, there is nothing in the content of the sentence
in (30a) that could be used to support the scalar presupposition in (30c), the particle
is either perceived as deviant in these contexts or an appropriate preference relation
is accommodated. The same considerations apply to the derivation of the plausibility
13 See e.g. Hansson 2001: 67-70 on how to define preferences among compatible propositions.
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of weak even in the scope of factive desire predicates and in imperatives.14
Restricted distribution
Weak even is illicit in the scope of doxastic attitude predicates. This is expected
on the approach to attitude predicates entertained in this section: desire but not
doxastic attitude predicates have a negation-related semantics; the semantics of
doxastic attitude predicates is upward-entailing (Hintikka 1962). Accordingly,
the scalar presupposition triggered by the sentence in (31a), given in (31c), is
unsatisfiable: due to the upward-entailingness of believe it holds that for every n >
0, the proposition that I believe that John made n videos of that quality entails the
proposition that I believe that John made one video of that quality – thus, none of
the former propositions can be more likely than the latter proposition, contra (31c).
(31) a. #I believe that John made even ONE video of that quality.
b. [even C1] [I believe John made oneF video of that quality]
c. ∃q ∈ {that I believe that John made n videos of that quality | n ∈ N>0}:
that I believe that John made one video of that quality Cc q
The infelicity of weak even under intend and command has a different source.
Although both predicates arguably share the non-monotone semantics of want, which
suffices for even that scopes above them to trigger a presupposition compatible with
(3), this presupposition is not plausible. Unlike with hope and its kin, the desiderative
component of intend and command cannot be used in tandem with the preferences
in the context to support the scalar presupposition in (32c): if I intend to make one
video of that quality and prefer making two videos of that quality to making one
video of that quality, it does not necessarily hold that I intend to make two videos of
that quality (similar reasoning applies to command). Furthermore, there is nothing
else in the meaning of intend and command that would make it plausible to treat
weaker intentions and commands as less likely than stronger ones.
(32) a. #I intend to make even ONE video of that quality.
b. #[even C1] [I intend [PROI to make oneF video of that quality]]
c. ∃q ∈ {that I intend to make n videos of that quality | n ∈ N>0}: that I
intend to make one video of that quality Cc q
14 There is a prominent approach to even that assumes that even is ambiguous and that weak even spells
out the item with a more restricted distribution (e.g. Rooth 1985, Rullmann 1997). Applied to the
cases above, such an approach has a difficulty (i) explaining why weak even may not occur in positive
episodic sentences but may occur in desire statements and imperatives and (ii) accounting for the
glaring context-dependence of weak even in these environments.
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This is different with challenge. Its semantic import includes the requirement that
the challenged task is difficult, e.g. in (33a) it requires it to be difficult to make one
video of that quality. This information can be used in supporting an appropriate
likelihood relation among the alternatives: it may very well be less likely that one is
challenged to perform an easy task – making one video of that quality – rather than
to perform a harder alternative task – making two or more videos of that quality.
(33) a. I challenge you to make even ONE video of that quality.
b. [even C1] [I challenge you [ PROyou to make oneF video ...]]
c. ∃q ∈ {that I challenge you to make n videos of that quality | n ∈ N>0}:
that I challenge you to make one video of that quality Cc q
Extra inference
Desire statements containing weak even occur in contexts that are biased. The bias
they exhibit is described in (22), repeated below. For example, any context in which
(34a) is used satisfies the condition in (34b): the attitude holder takes it to be unlikely
that the alternatives to the sentential complement of hope will obtain.
(22) Low probability bias
A context satisfies the low probability bias wrt a set of alternatives and an
individual if the individual takes the alternatives to be unlikely to obtain.
(34) a. John hopes to make even ONE video of that quality.
b. John believes it is unlikely that he will make one video of that quality.
Low probability bias emerges from the interaction of the scalar presupposition
triggered by even, which is satisfied in contexts in which stronger alternatives to the
sentential complement of the desire predicate are better than the proposition denoted
by the sentential complement, and the link between one’s desires and one’s actions.
We sketch the reasoning on the basis of (34): Having a desire to make a certain
number of videos of that quality is linked to how the attitude holder chooses to act.
Different acts result in different outcomes and the attitude holder’s choice is guided
by optimizing her chances of being happy with the outcomes. Now, having the desire
to make one and the desire to make, say, two videos of that quality is linked to the
pursuit of outcomes corresponding to making one and to making two videos of that
quality, respectively. In a context in which (34a) is felicitous, the latter outcomes are
more desirable to the attitude holder than the former (or at least as desirable). The
pursuit of the former is thus legitimate only if the attitude holder takes the latter to
be sufficiently less likely to obtain. Namely, only in this case is he optimizing her
chances of being happy.
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A problem for the approach
The negation-related approach to desire and imperatives successfully explains the
potential felicity of weak even in their scope. However, it faces the problem that its
treatment of desire predicates and the imperative operator as non-monotone functions
does not seem to be warranted in light of the data in (35) and (36),15 as has been
forcefully argued by von Fintel (1999). Namely, if the semantics of desire predicates
were non-monotone, the pattern in (35) should not hold and the discourse in (36)
should be acceptable since the conjuncts would be independent. This is not the case.
(35) a. John hopes to make more than five videos of that quality.
b. ⇒ John hopes to make more than one video of that quality.
(36) #John wants a free flight on the Concorde but he doesn’t want a flight on the
Concorde.
3.2 Monotone desire
Doubly-relative modal analysis and upward-entailingness
The modal semantics of desire predicates is relativized to two conversational back-
grounds (von Fintel 1999). The first conversational background – the modal base
– delivers a set of doxastically accessible worlds of the attitude holder, while the
second conversational background – the bouletic ordering source – provides the
propositions that are used in ordering this set. For perspicuity, we assume that among
the doxastically accessible worlds one can always find a set of worlds that are not
worse with respect to the given bouletic ordering source than other doxastically
accesible worlds (limit assumption); these are the desire-best worlds.16 A desire
statement of the form i hopes that p then states that all the desire-best worlds of i
are such that p is true in them (37). As before, desire predicates presuppose that
their propositional argument is independent of the attitude holder’s belief state. The
semantics of imperatives is identical to (37), modulo the authority presupposition
(cf. Schwager 2005).
(37) If defined, [[ hope ]]g,c(f, g, p, i, w) = ∀w’∈BEST(∩f(i,w), g(i,w)) [p(w’)=1]
15 Apparently convincing examples that do support the idea that desire predicates are non-monotone and
that do not crucially involve context-shifting discourses are the so-called Ross’s paradox examples (i)
(cf. Aloni 2007 and others). We defer an investigation of them to another occasion.
(i) I hope to send this letter; I hope to send or burn this letter
16 A world w’ is not worse than a world w” with respect to an individual i, a world w and an ordering
source g iff for all p ∈ g(i,w): if w” ∈ p, then w’ ∈ p. The best worlds with respect to f, g, i, w are
BEST(∩f(i,w), g(i,w)) = {w’ | w’ ∈ ∩f(i,w) and there is no w” ∈ ∩f(i,w) such that w” <g(i,w) w’}.
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Desire predicates and the imperative operator are clearly upward-entailing on this
approach: if I hope to make two videos, then all my desire-best worlds are such that
I make two videos in them; it follows that all my desire-best worlds are such that I
make one video in them and, thus, that I hope to make one video.
The puzzle
If desire predicates and the imperative operator are upward-entailing, the occurrence
of weak even in their scope is unexpected. Namely, a sentence like (38a) may have
the two structures in (38bc) and in both structures the domain of even contains only
alternatives that entail the prejacent of even, causing its scalar presupposition to be
illicit. For example, the presupposition of (38c) is given in (39). It is deviant since it
holds that for all n > 0, the proposition that I hope to make n videos of that quality
entails the proposition that I hope to make one video of that quality and thus cannot
be more likely than it.
(38) a. I hope to make even ONE video of that quality.
b. [I hope [[even C1] PROI to make oneF video of that quality]]
c. [even C1] [I hope to make oneF video of that quality]
(39) [[ (38c) ]]g,c is defined only if ∃q ∈ {that I hope to make n videos of that
quality | n ∈ N>0}: that I hope to make one video of that quality Cc q
Strengthening in grammar
Although even in (38a) moves above the desire predicate at LF as in (38c), we put
forward that it quantifies in its scoped position over a different domain of alternatives
than indicated in (39). Its domain is rather the one given in (40) where the alternatives
are mutually exclusive: e.g. if it holds that I hope to make one video and I am okay
with making exactly one video, then it is false that I hope to make, say, two videos
and vice versa.
(40) {that I hope to make n videos of that quality & I am okay with making
exactly n videos of that quality | n ∈ N>0}
This domain is obtained by inserting a covert strengthening operator ONLY that
associates with one into the structure of the sentence and moving even above it:
(41) [even C1] [ONLY C0] [I hope to make oneF video of that quality]
A simplified meaning of ONLY is given in (42): its import is that all the alternatives
in its domain that do not entail the prejacent are false (cf. Fox 2007 for a more
746
How to get even with desires
sophisticated analysis). The meaning of the sister of even in (41) is computed in (43)
and is equivalent to the proposition that I hope to make one video of that quality
and I am okay with making exactly one video of that quality. The alternatives in
the domain of even in (41) are determined analogously and the domain has thus the
form given in (40).
(42) [[ ONLY ]]g,c(C, p, w) = 1 iff p(w) = 1 ∧ ∀q ∈ C [p * q ∧ q(w) = 0]
(43) [[ [ONLY C0] [I hope to make oneF video of that quality] ]]g,c(w) = 1 iff I
hope to make one video of that quality in w & for n > 1, it is not the case
that I hope to make n videos of that quality in w
Consistency and plausibility of the scalar presupposition
The scalar presupposition triggered by even in (41) is given in (44): there is an
alternative that is more likely than that I hope to make one video of that quality and I
am okay with making exactly one video of that quality. Since the alternatives in the
domain of even are mutually exclusive, the presupposition in (44) complies with (3).
(44) ∃q ∈ {that I hope to make n videos of that quality & I am okay with making
exactly n videos of that quality | n ∈ N>0}: that I hope to make 1 video of
that quality & I am okay with making exactly 1 video of that quality Cc q
Although due to their mutual exclusivity any likelihood relation may obtain on the
alternatives described in (44), not every likelihood relation on them is plausible.
More concretely, the presupposition in (44) is satisfied in contexts in which it jointly
holds (i) that if there are preferences that distinguish making more videos of that
quality and making fewer videos, then making more videos is preferred to making
fewer and (ii) that some alternatives are preferentially distinguishable from the
proposition that I make one video of that quality. Namely, given this information,
the expectation is that one hopes to make a notable number of videos of that quality
rather than that one hopes to make one video of that quality and is okay with just one.
Thus, in such a context there is an alternative that is more likely than the prejacent.
Restricted distribution and extra inference
The infelicity of weak even in the scope of believe, intend and command is a conse-
quence of an implausible scalar presupposition. That is, although the strengthening
mechanism rescues moved even from triggering a presupposition that would clash
with (3), the presupposition it does trigger is implausible. An example with a doxas-
tic predicate is given in (45). The sentence in (45a) has the structure in (45b): even
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scopes above the doxastic predicate and the strengthening operator. The assertive
meaning of the sentence is expressed in (45c).
(45) a. #John believes that he will make even ONE video of that quality.
b. [even C1] [ONLY C0] [John believes he will make oneF video ...]
c. John believes that he will make one video of that quality & John
believes that he might make exactly one video of that quality
The scalar presupposition of the sentence is that there is an alternative in the domain
of even that is more likely than its prejacent (46). Unlike with desire predicates
where their desiderative component and the relevant preferences in the context were
shown to play a decisive role in making the scalar presupposition plausible, there is
no component in the semantics of believe that could perform a similar function.
(46) ∃q ∈ {that John believes that he will make n videos of that quality & John
believes that he might make exactly n videos of that quality | n∈N>0}: that
John believes that he will make one video of that quality & John believes
that he might make exactly one video of that quality Cc q
Similar considerations apply to intend and command. Namely, there is no component
of the meaning of these predicates that would support the scalar presupposition
triggered by weak even (see discussion in the preceding subsection). Accordingly,
weak even is pragmatically deviant under intend and command. This is different for
challenge that has a component that can be utilized to support the respective scalar
presupposition: it requires the challenged task to be difficult. Since it naturally holds
that more difficult tasks qualify as more reasonable challenges, it may very well be
less likely that someone is challenged to do an easy task rather than a hard task. The
extra inference is derived as in the preceding section.
A problem for the approach
The strengthening operator ONLY may apply in the absence of intensional operators.
Accordingly, it could be used to rescue weak even in simple episodic sentences.
For example, the sentence in (47a) could be parsed as (47b) where even takes scope
above ONLY. The scalar presupposition of (47b) is given in (47c). It complies
with (3) and may very well be true – it may be the case that it is less likely that
John read exactly one book than, say, that he read exactly two books. That is, the
presupposition in (47c) is satisfied in appropriate contexts. However, the sentence in
(47a) is judged as deviant even in such contexts. This is unexpected.
(47) a. #John read even ONE book.
b. [even C1] [ONLY C0] [ John read oneF book]
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c. [[ (47a) ]]g,c is defined only if ∃q ∈ {that John read exactly n books |
N>0}: that John read exactly one book Cc q
4 Conclusion
Weak even is in appropriate contexts felicitous in non-negative desire statements
and in imperatives. If we assume that even may move at LF, this is expected on the
negation-related approach to desire and imperatives. Namely, since the approach
assigns the respective operators a non-monotone semantics, movement of even above
them allows even to trigger a presupposition that is correct in appropriate contexts.
The main problem for the negation-related approach is that non-negative desire
predicates and the imperative operator appear to be upward-entailing rather than
non-monotone. On the more standard modal approach to desire and imperatives,
the occurrence of weak even is at first unexpected in these environments – namely,
according to the approach they are upward-entailing and weak even should not
be able to occur in upward-entailing environments. We dealt with this puzzle by
assuming that a strengthening mechanism may apply in the scope of moved even
that allows it to trigger a correct presupposition. The main problem for the approach
is restricting the application of this rescuing mechanism. A further investigation into
both of the above-mentioned problems is mandated.
We conclude the paper by looking at the occurrences of stressed any and ever in
desire statements and imperatives (48). These are unexpected on the characterization
of the licensing conditions of negative polarity items (NPIs) in (49) (von Fintel 1999).
Namely, desire predicates and the imperative operator are either non-monotone or
upward-entailing – they are not (Strawson) downward-entailing (DE).
(48) a. I am glad that ANYONE likes me. (Kadmon & Landman 1993)
b. Find me a politician that EVER cared for us AT ALL.
c. He wished ANYONE AT ALL would look at him with that same love
and sweetness.
(49) NPI licensing condition
NPIs are only grammatical if they are in the scope of a Strawson DE
operator.
A possible response to the data in (48) is to redefine the NPI licensing condition, e.g.
so that it requires NPIs to occur under non-upward-entailing operators (cf. Progovac
1994: 279). However, any such response leaves a crucial property of the NPIs in
(48) unexplained: their context-dependence. For example, Kadmon & Landman
(1993: 388) point out that (48a) is only felicitous in contexts in which the attitude
holder has a preference for a certain subset of people in the domain of anyone to like
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him. In this respect, the sentences in (48) closely resemble desire statements and
imperatives with weak even that we have discussed in this paper. This resemblance
suggests that a more fruitful way of dealing with (48) might be to assume that their
distribution is governed by a covert even (Krifka 1995). More precisely, we may
assume that stressed any and ever are existential quantifiers that come with a covert
even; their alternatives are existential quantifiers that differ from any and ever only
in that their domains are subsets of the domains of any and ever (Krifka 1995,
Chierchia 2010). This effectively reduces the configurations with stressed any and
ever to those with weak even discussed above: even associates with an element that
is entailed by all of its alternatives. The derivation of the correctness of the scalar
presuppositions triggered by the covert even in (48) may thus proceed along the lines
described in section 3. Since stressed any and ever are ‘licensed’ if the covert even
that associates with them triggers a correct scalar presupposition, their felicity and
context-dependence in (48) is explained.
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